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This paper quantiﬁes lifetime redistribution in Dutch occupational pension schemes associated
with uniform pricing. Information about the extent of redistribution is important because it will
inﬂuence the public acceptance of the pension system. The uniform contribution rate is split up
into a saving share and a transfer share for different socioeconomic groups. The transfer share,
in turn, consists of intergenerational and intragenerational transfers. We ﬁnd that the relative size
of the saving- and transfer shares strongly depends on socioeconomic characteristics, such as
gender and level of education. The saving part is higher for females than for males and it
increases with the level of education, which implies that uniform pricing involves a large transfer
from males to females and from low educated to higher educated workers. The impact of
intergenerational transfers is modest.
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Abstract in Dutch
In deze studie wordt de herverdeling in de tweede pijler van het Nederlandse pensioenstelsel in
kaart gebracht die voortvloeit uit de doorsneepremie in combinatie met de tijdsevenredige
pensioenopbouw. Inzicht in deze herverdeling is van groot belang, omdat zowel de richting als
de omvang ervan van invloed kunnen zijn op het maatschappelijke draagvlak voor het
pensioenstelsel. De doorsneepremie wordt gesplitst in een zuivere spaar- en een
overdrachtscomponent waarbij onderscheid wordt gemaakt naar sociaal-economische status van
de deelnemer. De overdrachtscomponent kan nader worden onderverdeeld in inter- en
intragenerationele herverdeling. Uit de analyse blijkt dat de grootte van de spaar- en
overdrachtscomponent sterk samenhangt met sociaal-economische status. Zo is voor
vrouwelijke werknemers het spaargedeelte van de doorsneepremie hoger dan voor mannelijke
werknemers. Hetzelfde geldt voor hoger opgeleide werknemers in relatie tot lager opgeleide
werknemers. Deze uitkomsten impliceren dat in de tweede pijler grote overdrachten
plaatsvinden tussen enerzijds mannen en vrouwen en anderzijds tussen laag- en hoogopgeleiden.
De omvang van de intergenerationele herverdeling is beperkt.
Steekwoorden: herverdeling (over de levensloop), doorsneepremie, netto proﬁjt
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56Summary
This study measures lifetime redistribution in the second pillar of the Dutch pension system. It is
important to have a clear idea about the magnitude and direction of the redistributional effects,
because the relative size of socially desired and undesired redistribution will determine the
public acceptance of the pension system. In addition, from an economic point of view
redistributional effects can provide useful information about potential labour market distortions.
In the Netherlands, collective second-pillar pension schemes are supplementary to the
unfunded (ﬁrst-pillar) pension provision and are characterized by collective agreements,
funding, uniform pricing, mandatory participation and forced annuitization. The market value of
the annuity contracts offered by these pension schemes depends on individual characteristics,
like age and gender, which does not hold true for the uniform contributions charged. Differences
between the market price of a pension scheme and the costs imply redistribution between groups
of participants. The goal of this paper is to quantify the extent of this redistribution for different
socioeconomic groups.
This paper focuses solely on redistribution that is independent of a shock occurring and ex ante
leads to transfers between groups of participants (ex ante redistribution). Redistribution that
relates to risk sharing and occurs after the pension fund experiences ﬁnancial losses or gains will
not be considered (ex post redistribution). We measure redistribution as the difference between
the expected present values of pension contributions and pension beneﬁts. This way of
measuring lifetime redistribution enables us to break down the uniform contribution rate into a
saving share and a transfer share.
The transfer share entails two sources of redistribution: intergenerational redistribution and
intragenerational redistribution. Intergenerational redistribution originates from the gift that was
made to the elderly working generations at the time the uniform contribution rate was
implemented. For old workers the uniform contribution rate is lower than the actuarial value of
the pension rights build up, while for young workers it is higher. Consequently, the introduction
of uniform pricing creates a gain for the workers who are elderly at that time because they
beneﬁt from below actuarially fair contributions without having made above actuarially fair
contributions earlier. The burden of this gift is imposed on all subsequent generations who face a
lower return on their pension contribution than they would have earned had they invested it on
the capital market. This foregone return can be interpreted as an interest payment on the
unfunded introductory gift and in this sense, it entails intergenerational redistribution.
Intragenerational redistribution originates from individual differences in either life
expectancy, income growth or labour force participation growth. The present discounted value of
pension beneﬁts as a percentage of lifetime income is increasing in life expectancy and the
growth rates of income and labour force participation. As a consequence, uniform pricing
7redistributes from persons with a short life expectancy to persons with a long life expectancy and
from persons with a high growth in income or labour force participation to persons with low
growth in these variables.
In the Netherlands, there are large differences in life expectancy across socioeconomic
groups. Females have in general longer life expectancies than males. The same holds for high
educated persons compared to low educated persons, irrespective of gender. Hence, uniform
pricing redistributes from male workers to female workers and from low educated workers to
high educated workers. To allow for these socioeconomic differences in life expectancy, we
consider a pension fund that consists of participants who differ in age, level of education and
gender. Intragenerational redistribution in this study therefore focuses on transfers between
males and females (cross-gender transfers) and transfers between agents of the same gender but
with different educational levels (intereducational transfers).
Although the Dutch occupational pension system consists of a wide variety of pension funds,
the vast majority of the participants have a pension scheme with Deﬁned Beneﬁts (DB) based on
the average wage earned. Our modelling of the system involves some necessary simpliﬁcation.
In order to quantify lifetime redistribution, we represent the entire system using a model of a
single representative pension fund. We impose that the pension fund does not experience
funding deﬁcits or surpluses and that pension rights of participants are (unconditionally) indexed
to wages. This simpliﬁcation is defensible since we are only interested in ex ante redistribution.
We ﬁnd that the saving share in the uniform contribution rate is much larger than the transfer
share. Nevertheless, there are signiﬁcant differences across socioeconomic groups. The saving
share is higher for females than for males and it increases with the level of education, which
implies that uniform pricing involves large transfers from males to females and from low
educated to higher educated workers. We ﬁnd that differences in life expectancy are far more
important for the size of intragenerational transfers than individual differences in income growth
or labour force participation growth. The impact of intergenerational transfers is modest.
Population forecasts reveal a convergence in life expectancies of males relative to females in
the near future. In addition, there is evidence that labour force participation rates of females will
increase in the coming decades. Both developments affect the amount of cross-gender
redistribution. The ﬁrst one will actually reduce cross-gender redistribution, the second one will
increase it. We ﬁnd that the effect of converging life expectancies dominates which implies that
the transfers from males to females are likely to decline in the future.
81 Introduction
Redistribution is an important objective of unfunded (ﬁrst-pillar) pension schemes. According to
the well known proposal of the World Bank, ﬁrst-pillar pensions should exactly perform this
task, while the saving function should be achieved by the second pillar (see World Bank (1994)).
In practice, however, redistribution may also play a role in second-pillar pensions which are
typically funded and characterized by a uniform contribution rate (in percentage of the wage
earned) and a linear pension accrual. The market value of the annuity contracts offered by these
pension schemes depends on individual characteristics, like age and gender, which does not hold
true for the uniform contributions charged. Differences between the market price of a pension
scheme and the costs imply redistribution between groups of participants.
There are surprisingly few studies that quantify the extent of redistribution in collective
funded pension schemes. Most of the existing literature focusing on redistribution is restricted to
unfunded pensions (see, e.g., Ter Rele (2005), Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001), Cubeddu
(2000) and Sommacal (2006)). In this paper, though, we investigate redistribution in the second
pillar of the Dutch pension system. The collective pension schemes in the second pillar are
supplementary to the basic ﬁrst-pillar pension provision and are characterized by funding,
mandatory participation, forced annuitization and uniform pricing.1
Information about the magnitude and direction of the redistributional effects is important
because it will inﬂuence public acceptance of the pension system (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held
(2001)). As long as contributions are perceived as savings and not as taxes, workers are more
willing to pay them and there will be no or only small deadweight losses. If, in turn,
contributions are viewed as pure taxes, welfare losses are created by lower labour supply in the
form of reductions in work hours or, more drastically, less participation (Cubeddu (2000)).
The goal of this paper is to identify the relative importance of the saving share and transfer
share of the pension contributions for different socioeconomic groups. We distinguish between
intragenerational redistribution and intergenerational redistribution. In the analysis we only
focus on old-age pensions leaving aside the role of surviving dependants’ pensions. In order to
quantify redistribution, we consider a single pension fund which is representative for the second
pillar of the Dutch pension system. This fund offers a pension scheme with Deﬁned Beneﬁts
(DB) linked to the average wage earned. Participants differ with respect to age, gender and level
of education. Intragenerational redistribution takes place between males and females on the one
hand (cross-gender redistribution) and between individuals with different levels of education on
the other hand (intereducational redistribution). We ﬁrst calculate a baseline scenario in which
the economic and demographic environments are held constant, but we also present alternative
1 Throughout this paper, we deﬁne uniform pricing as the combination of a uniform contribution rate (in percentage of the
contribution base) and a linear pension accrual.
9scenarios that allow for changing demographic circumstances.
Our method of measuring redistribution in a funded pension scheme with uniform pricing is
based on generational accounting and closely related to Ter Rele (2005). Ter Rele (2005)
emphasizes the need to measure redistribution on a lifetime basis. Annual redistribution is
misleading as an indicator of redistribution because an individual’s net beneﬁt from collective
arrangements does not remain constant throughout life. We therefore measure redistribution as
the difference between the expected present values of pension contributions and pension
beneﬁts, which is a standard way of measuring lifetime redistribution in the literature (see
Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001)). We focus solely on redistribution that is independent of a
shock occurring and ex ante leads to transfers between groups of participants (ex ante
redistribution). Redistribution that relates to risk sharing and occurs after the pension fund
experiences a ﬁnancial loss or gain will not be considered (ex post redistribution).
The paper complements the study of Ter Rele (2005) who measures lifetime redistribution in
the ﬁrst pillar of the Dutch pension system. Related literature includes Boeijen et al. (2006) and
Bonenkamp et al. (2006) who analyse intergenerational redistribution in Dutch occupational
pensions but do not consider intragenerational issues. The paper is closer in spirit to that of Hári
et al. (2006) who quantify the money’s worth of participation in collective pension schemes for
different socioeconomic groups. Our paper complements this work along two lines. First, we
measure redistribution on a lifetime basis rather than on an annual basis thereby controlling for
intrapersonal transfers over the lifecycle. Second, to measure redistribution appropriately both
beneﬁts and costs of participation in a pension scheme should be included. While Hári et al.
(2006) mainly restrict their analysis to a comparison of the beneﬁts of participation among
different groups, we also include the uniform contributions charged.
We ﬁnd that the saving- and transfer share of the uniform contribution rate heavily depend on
socioeconomic characteristics, such as gender and level of education. The saving share is higher
for female workers than for male workers and it increases with the level of education. In
addition, we observe a large transfer from males to females and from low educated workers to
other workers. If we account for the expected convergence of life expectancies between males
and females in the coming decades, the cross-gender redistribution will reduce to some extent.
The impact of intergenerational redistribution seems to be modest.
This rest of this study is organised as follows. In section 2 we introduce the different sources
of redistribution in a funded pension scheme with uniform pricing. Section 3 describes the
representative pension fund and its heterogeneous participants. In addition, it shows how to
calculate the different sources of redistribution deﬁned in section 2. In section 4 we present the
baseline scenario in which the economic and demographic exogenous variables are held
constant, whereas section 5 discusses two alternative scenarios in which we allow for two future
demographic developments, namely increasing life expectancy and increasing labour force
participation of females. Finally, section 6 concludes.
102 Deﬁning redistribution
In the Netherlands, a pension fund is obliged to charge a uniform contribution rate. That means
that all participants of a pension fund, irrespective of age, gender and level of education, pay the
same contribution rate. The uniform contribution rate differs from the actuarially fair
contribution rate, i.e. the contribution sum that exactly matches the value of new accrued
pension rights in that speciﬁc year. At the individual level, the actuarial cost price of a given
pension beneﬁt increases with age. The reason for this is that the period over which the
contributions of a worker yield returns becomes shorter as this person approaches retirement. In
addition, the likelihood of surviving until retirement increases as people get older. Because
building up pension rights is linear in the Netherlands, the positive link between cost price and
age turns over to the actuarially fair contribution rate which also increases with age.
The difference between the contribution that a participant actually pays each year (i.e. the
uniform contribution) and the contribution that should be paid according to the actuarial value of
the accrued pension rights (i.e. the actuarially fair contribution), deﬁnes the yearly redistribution
between a participant and other members of the pension fund. Uniform pricing implies a large
redistribution from young workers to old workers. For young agents the redistribution is
generally positive implying that they contribute more to the pension fund than the actuarially fair
level. For older participants it is just the other way around. They face a negative redistribution
which means that they receive a subsidy on their actuarially fair contribution. Calculations for
the Netherlands suggest that a 25-year-old worker contributes on average 25% too much,
whereas a 60-year-old worker contributes 30% too little (Bonenkamp et al. (2006)).
2.1 Lifetime redistribution
Since a worker is a net contributor during the ﬁrst part of his working life and a net receiver
during the second part, uniform pricing actually involves a redistribution of pension
contributions over an individual’s career. To correct for these intrapersonal payments we deﬁne
redistribution on a lifetime basis.
Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001) distinguish three concepts of lifetime redistribution:
deviations from absolute equivalence, deviations from relative equivalence and deviations from
the principle that no opportunity costs should be foregone. The ﬁrst one, deviations from
absolute equivalence, is the standard way of deﬁning transfer in the literature and also the one
used in this paper. A transfer to or from an individual is deﬁned as any difference between the
expected present discounted values of beneﬁts and contributions. The second concept, deviations
from relative equivalence, is a weaker concept. A pension scheme is considered as obeying the
principle of relative equivalence if, for each individual, the present discounted value of pension
beneﬁts is not necessarily equal but at least proportional to the net present value of contributions.
11This deﬁnition is much weaker than the previous one because the proportionality factor does not
have to be one.
Often participation in the pension scheme is mandatory. If there are alternative investments
that can serve as an equally generous provision for old-age consumption but yields higher
returns, there are opportunity costs of being forced into the mandatory pension scheme. Under
this view, the difference between the return in alternative schemes and the rate of return in the
mandatory pension scheme could be interpreted as the tax share of contributions (or, if negative,
as the subsidy share). In this paper, we also brieﬂy discuss this last concept of redistribution, but
the main focus will be on the ﬁrst concept, deviations from absolute equivalence.
In a funded pension scheme with uniform pricing there are two reasons why the present value
of lifetime pension contributions can differ from that of lifetime pension beneﬁts. The ﬁrst
reason is that the pension contributions of the current and future participants partly entail a
redistribution to former generations for which they do not get any compensation
(subsection 2.2). Second, since participants of a pension fund generally differ in terms of life
expectancy, income perspectives and labour force participation proﬁle, uniform pricing also
redistributes between individuals of the same generation (subsection 2.3).
2.2 Intergenerational redistribution
In the ﬁrst part of one’s working life workers subsidize older workers, during the second part
they receive a subsidy. Viewed in this way, a pension scheme with a uniform contribution rate
has some characteristics of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. This notion allows us to draw a
parallel between a PAYG scheme and a funded pension scheme with uniform pricing.
Consider a country that introduces a public PAYG pension scheme. At the time of
introduction the people who are retired beneﬁt, because they receive a public pension provision
without having made any contribution to the system in the past. However, this introductory gain
of the ﬁrst generations cannot be passed on to all subsequent generations without any cost.
These generations are forced to participate in a pension scheme with a lower return than the
market rate of interest they would earn if the PAYG contributions were invested in the capital
market. To see this, note that in a stable economic and demographic environment the implicit
return in a PAYG system is equal to the population growth rate plus the growth rate of aggregate
income. In a dynamically efﬁcient economy this composite growth rate will certainly be lower
than the market interest rate in the long run. Since any pension scheme must be a zero-sum game
among all participating generations, the present value of the missed returns of all subsequent
generations is equal to the introductory gain of the ﬁrst generations (Sinn (2000)).
A funded pension scheme with uniform pricing can be viewed as a mixture between a pure
PAYG scheme and a completely fair funded pension scheme. Therefore, the economic logic of a
PAYG scheme also partly applies to a funded scheme with uniform pricing. No matter how the
12introduction of this scheme will be organised, it creates a gain for the elderly working
generations at that time. These generations beneﬁt from below cost-effective uniform
contributions without having made above cost-effective contributions earlier. Like in a pure
PAYG scheme, the burden of the introductory gain is necessarily imposed on all subsequent
generations. These generations participate in a pension deal with a composite rate of return that
falls somewhere between the market interest rate and the implicit return of a PAYG scheme. As
long as an economy is dynamically efﬁcient, this composite return is lower than the market
interest rate. This implies that for a given level of pension beneﬁts, a participant has to contribute
more than he would contribute in a funded pension scheme with fair pricing. Similar to a PAYG
scheme, the additional contributions imposed on all subsequent generations are equal to the
introductory gain in present value terms. Therefore, these additional contributions can be viewed
as an intergenerational redistribution from future generations to the generations who received the
introductory gain.
2.3 Intragenerational redistribution
For Dutch schemes, Kuné (2005) gives an extensive overview of the types of intragenerational
redistribution we may think of, such as redistribution between males and females, between
individuals with a steep and ﬂat career, between low and high educated people, between workers
and disabled persons, between single and married people, etc. Some of these transfers might be
desired, others might be undesired, but they all share the property that they are not related to the
ﬁnancial position of a pension fund and, hence, are pure forms of ex ante redistribution.
Theoretically, intragenerational transfers in funded pension schemes with uniform pricing
originate from differences in life expectancy, income growth and labour force participation
growth. The actuarial value of future pension beneﬁts is increasing in life expectancy since in
expectation people with low life expectancies will receive pension beneﬁts over a shorter period
than people with high life expectancies. Therefore, uniform pricing redistributes from persons
with a short life expectancy to persons with a long life expectancy. The uniform contribution rate
also redistributes from persons with a ﬂat income or participation proﬁle to persons with a steep
one. People with a steep proﬁle beneﬁt from uniform pricing because they build up relatively
more pension rights at the end of the career, the period in which pension accrual is subsidized by
young workers.2 As such, it is not the level of income or labour force participation that
determines intragenerational redistribution as is often thought, but the individual change in
income or labour force participation relative to those of other persons.
The extent to which intragenerational redistribution is proﬁtable or harmful for an individual,
2 Note that this channel of intragenerational redistribution is more important in a ﬁnal-wage scheme than in an
average-wage scheme. The Netherlands has recently experienced a large-scale transition from ﬁnal-wage schemes to
average-wage schemes. Therefore, the impact of this redistribution has been declined.
13depends on the distribution of the relevant individual characteristics (i.e. life expectancy, income
proﬁle and labour force participation proﬁle) over the total pension fund population. If these
characteristics are more or less uniformly distributed, the gains and losses will be of equal size at
the individual level. If the distribution is skewed, however, the persons with extremely deviating
characteristics will experience large gains or losses while the majority of the persons will hardly
be affected. For example, the advantage of uniform pricing is higher for a person with a long life
expectancy, if he is the only individual with this characteristic, because then the uniform
contribution rate is low compared to his actuarially fair rate. At the same time, the disadvantage
of the other persons is limited as they can spread the burden over a relatively large group.
However, if the number of persons with long life expectancy increases, this will drive up the
uniform contribution rate and will reduce (increase) the advantage (disadvantage) of a person
with a long (short) life expectancy.
143 The pension fund
Although the second pillar in the Netherlands consists of a wide variety of pension funds, 76%
of the participants have an DB pension scheme based on the average-wage system (DNB
(2007)). In this system pension beneﬁts are linked to the average wage over a participant’s entire
career. We represent the entire second pillar using a model of a single representative pension
fund. This pension fund offers an average-wage DB scheme. Most pension funds in the
Netherlands aim at wage- or price indexation. This is not guaranteed, but is conditional on the
ﬁnancial position of the fund. For simpliﬁcation, we abstract from conditional indexation and
assume that the pension fund does not experience funding deﬁcits or surpluses and pension
rights are unconditionally indexed to wages. This simpliﬁcation is defensible since we are only
interested in ex ante redistribution, i.e. redistribution that takes place regardless of the ﬁnancial
position of the pension fund.
3.1 The participants
It is well known that females have a longer life expectancy than males. Therefore, a pension
scheme with uniform pricing will redistribute pension contributions from males to females.
Also, there is much evidence that high educated people have a higher life expectancy than low
educated people. Hoyert et al. (2001), for example, show that mortality rates for Americans aged
25 to 64 who have attended college are less than half the rates for those who stopped education
after completing high school. Deboosere and Gadeyne (2002) conclude, using Belgian data, that
the difference in life expectancy between high educated and low educated males is 5.3 years. For
females this difference amounts 3 years. In the Netherlands this difference is 4.9 years for males,
while for females it amounts 2.6 years (Van Herten et al. (2002)).
To allow for these socioeconomic differences in life expectancy, we consider a pension fund
that consists of participants who differ in age, level of education and gender. There are four
educational levels: low education (L), low secondary (LS) education, high secondary (HS)
education and high (H) education.3 Since we also distinguish between male and female workers,
there are in total eight socioeconomic groups, each of which has its own survival probabilities,
labour force participation proﬁle and income proﬁle. As a consequence, intragenerational
redistribution in this paper can be split up into redistribution between males and females
(cross-gender redistribution) and transfers between agents of the same gender but with different
educational level (intereducational redistribution).
3 Low education means primary school only, low secondary education contains lower vocational training, high secondary
education represents secondary and intermediate college level and ﬁnally, high education contains higher vocational
training and academic level.
153.2 The pension scheme
Average-wage scheme
For simpliﬁcation it is assumed that the development of the population is only determined by
death and birth. There is no emigration or immigration. We allow for population growth
(decline) and time-varying mortality rates. It is further assumed that deaths and births occur at
the end of a period. Let n denote the growth rate of cohort sizes at birth, B the cohort size and
ε(j) the probability that an individual of age j lives throughout age j+1. Then a cohort of age
j = 0,..., je, with je the maximal attainable age, and at time t = 1,...,¥, evolves according to:
B(j,t) =



(1+n(t −1))B(0,t −1) if j = 0
ε(j−1,t −1)B(j−1,t −1) if 0 < j ≤ je
(3.1)
Obviously, ε(je,t) = 0.
All residents of the Netherlands receive a ﬁrst-pillar PAYG beneﬁt from the age of 65.
Funded pensions in the second pillar are supplementary to this ﬁrst-pillar beneﬁt. This implies
that workers do not need to build up future pension beneﬁts over their entire gross income.
Instead, a franchise is deducted to compensate for the ﬁrst pillar. Full-time income (Y), franchise
(F) and contribution base (G) of a cohort of age j = jw,..., jr −1, with jw the entrance age and
jr the retirement age, are given by:
Y(j,t) =
 
1+g(t)
 
1+φ(t)

Y(j,t −1) (3.2)
F(t) =
 
1+g(t)
 
1+φ(t)

F(t −1) (3.3)
G(j,t) =Y(j,t)−F(t) (3.4)
with g real wage growth and φ the inﬂation rate.
In an average-wage scheme the level of pension beneﬁts depends on the average wage the
participant has earned during his career. Each year the participant builds up a ﬁxed percentage
(α) of his contribution base as pension accrual. To correct for part-time employment,
non-participation, and early retirement the contribution base will be multiplied by the labour
force participation rate (p), expressed in full-time equivalents. So, the individual pension accrual
(A) equals,
A(j,t) = αG(j,t)p(j,t), jw ≤ j < jr (3.5)
The pension scheme is characterized by a uniform contribution rate (πU). The pension
contributions will be fully attributed to the participants. This assumption implies that the
employer’s part of the contributions are shifted on to the employee. The uniform contribution
rate is deﬁned as the present value of the total (i.e. aggregated over all socioeconomic groups)
pension accrual divided by the total contribution base. That is,
πU(t) =
å
jr−1
j=jw B(j,t)A(j,t)δ(j,t)
å
jr−1
j=jw B(j,t)G(j,t)p(j,t)
(3.6)
16where δ(j) denotes the unit cost price of a wage-indexed pension beneﬁt at age j.4
The uniform contribution rate is the rate that is actually paid by the participants but it is not
equal to the actuarially fair contribution rate (πF), which is deﬁned as,5
πF(j,t) =
A(j,t)δ(j,t)
G(j,t)p(j,t)
(3.7)
or, by substituting equation (3.5),
πF(j,t) = αδ(j,t), jw ≤ j < jr (3.8)
In contrast to the uniform contribution rate πU, the actuarially fair rate πF is increasing in age
because the cost price δ increases with age.6
Parameter values
The parameter values of the average-wage scheme are summarized in table 3.1. The accrual rate
is 2% of the pension wage per year worked, which is quite common in Dutch occupational
pension schemes (DNB (2007)). It is further assumed that the pension fund can only invest in
one asset with a certain real rate of return of 3%. At this point we abstract from population
growth (n = 0) and set the real productivity growth at 1.7%. Note that this conﬁguration implies
that the implicit return on the intergenerational transfer is lower than the explicit rate of return on
pension savings (see the discussion in subsection 2.2). The retirement age is exogenous. All
participants start working at age 25 and will retire at age 65. Nobody becomes older than age 99.
Table 3.1 Characteristics average-wage scheme
Accrual rate (α) 2%
Franchise in base year (F) e 10,000
Real portfolio rate of return (r) 3%
Real productivity growth (g) 1.7%
Inﬂation rate (φ) 2%
Age of entry (jw) 25
Retirement age (jr) 65
Maximal attainable age (je) 99
3.3 Measuring redistribution
Recall that we deﬁne redistribution as any difference between the expected present discounted
value of beneﬁts (PVB) minus the expected present discounted value of contributions (PVC).
4 See equation (A.1) in appendix A for a formal deﬁnition of δ.
5 Note that for the pension fund it does not matter whether the contributions are ﬁnanced by πU or πF. In both cases it
collects the present value of the total pension accrual given by the nominator of equation (3.6).
6 The interested reader can check this from equation (A.1).
17Seen from the perspective of the worker, this deviation from absolute equivalence represents the
net beneﬁt (NB) of participating in the pension scheme. Formally, the net beneﬁt of a worker
who enters the pension scheme at (the end of) time t and from age j onwards and plans to retire
at age jr, is:
NB(j,t) = PVB(j,t)−PVC(j,t) (3.9)
in which:
PVB(j,t) =
jr−j−1
å
k=0
A(j+k,t +k)δ(j+k,t +k)R(k)
PVC(j,t) =
jr−j−1
å
k=0
πU(t +k)G(j+k,t +k)p(j+k,t +k)R(k)
R(k) =
k
Õ
l=1
ε(j+l −1,t +l −1)
1+r(t +l)
for k > 0 and R(0) = 1
where r is the discount rate which equals the nominal market interest rate.
In the simulations later on, we break down the uniform contributions into a saving share and
a transfer share. This boils down to rewriting (3.9) in PVC(j,t) = PVB(j,t)+PVT(j,t), with
PVT(j,t) ≡ −NB(j,t), and denoting PVB(j,t) as the saving share and PVT(j,t) as the transfer
share. So deﬁned, a positive transfer represents a payment, a negative transfer a subsidy.
Equation (3.9) takes the discount rate r as given. When we instead interpret the net beneﬁt as
a function of the discount rate r, set NB(r) to zero and solve for the discount rate, we obtain the
implicit rate of return of the pension scheme. Differences in the rates of return within a
generation can be interpreted as intragenerational redistribution, while differences of the implicit
returns between generations represent intergenerational redistribution.
Recall that the total transfer (PVT) can be split up into inter- and intragenerational transfers.
The intragenerational transfer, in turn, can be subdivided into cross-gender and intereducational
transfers. In order to identify these different sources of redistribution, we deﬁne three separate
uniform contribution rates: the individual uniform contribution rate, the generational uniform
contribution rate and the gender-speciﬁc uniform contribution rate.7 These contribution rates
share the common property that they are constant and actuarially fair over the working life of the
individual, the generation, or the gender involved.
Having deﬁned these contribution rates, total redistribution, expressed as percentage of the
contribution base, is equal to the uniform contribution rate minus the individual uniform
contribution rate (see table 3.2). To isolate the intergenerational transfer we have to compare the
uniform contribution rate with the generational uniform contribution rate. In the exceptional case
that the implicit return of a pension scheme with uniform pricing is equal to the market interest
rate, the uniform contribution rate coincides with the generational uniform contribution rate. In
7 See appendix A for a formal deﬁnition of these uniform contribution rates.
18Table 3.2 Measures of redistribution (% contribution base)
Total transfer = uniform CR (3.6) − individual uniform CR (A.5)
Intergenerational transfer = uniform CR (3.6) − generational uniform CR (A.6)
Cross-gender transfer = generational uniform CR (A.6) − gender-speciﬁc uniform CR (A.9)
Intereducational transfer = gender-speciﬁc uniform CR (A.9) − individual uniform CR (A.5)
Notes: CR = contribution rate. Numbers in brackets refer to the corresponding equation.
this case there is no intergenerational redistribution. However, if the market interest rate exceeds
the implicit return, as we have assumed, there is intergenerational redistribution.
To compute the cross-gender and intereducational transfers out of the intragenerational
transfer, we use the gender-speciﬁc uniform contribution rate, deﬁned for males and females
separately. The difference between the generational and gender-speciﬁc uniform contribution
rate measures the cross-gender transfer. Finally, the difference between the gender-speciﬁc
uniform contribution rate and the individual uniform contribution rate represents
intereducational redistribution.
19204 Baseline scenario
In this section, we quantify lifetime redistribution related to uniform pricing. We present a
baseline scenario in which demographics and labour force participation rates are held constant.
We start by explaining the data, then we turn to our main results and ﬁnally, we examine how
sensitive these results are for the underlying assumptions.
4.1 Data
Participants differ in terms of age, gender and educational level. These differences boil down to
three factors: survival probabilities, labour force participation and income. Recall that
differences in life expectancy (or survival probabilities), income proﬁle and labour force
participation proﬁle determine the direction and magnitude of the intragenerational transfers. In
addition, the magnitude of these transfers also depends on the relative size of the socioeconomic
groups in the pension fund population. In this subsection, we will discuss the baseline values of
these variables together with the population composition.
Population composition
Figure 4.1 shows the composition of the current Dutch population between age 25 and age 64
distinguished by gender and level of education. The distribution of the educational levels over
males and females is quite similar. For each gender the fraction of the people with high
secondary education is the highest, while the fraction of the people with low education is the
lowest. The percentage of the people with high education is higher in the male population while
the percentage of the people with low secondary education is lower.
Once we know the size of the educational- and gender-speciﬁc birth cohorts, the population
structure is completely determined by equation (3.1). We have calibrated these birth cohorts in
such a way that the relative sizes of the socioeconomic groups in the total population is
consistent with ﬁgure 4.1.
Survival probabilities
While educational-speciﬁc life expectancies are publicly available for the Netherlands, this is not
the case for the underlying mortality rates. Fortunately, Deboosere and Gadeyne (2002)
calculated educational-speciﬁc mortality rates for Belgium for the period 1991-1996. We use
their results to estimate Dutch mortality rates for each socioeconomic group. To compute these
estimates we have largely followed the procedure described in Hári et al. (2006). The main idea
is the following. First, we calculate, using these Belgian mortality data, for each socioeconomic
group the ratio between the educational-speciﬁc mortality rate and the average mortality rate.
The average mortality rate in this case, is the weighted average of Belgian mortality rates where
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weights are based on the number of persons present in each socioeconomic group in the
Netherlands. Second, we apply these ratios to gender-speciﬁc mortality rates of the Dutch
population, which, of course, are publicly available. Finally, we rescale the ratios in such a way
that for each socioeconomic group the life expectancy of a 25-year-old individual exactly
matches the corresponding life expectancy in actual Dutch data, as published by Van Herten
et al. (2002).
Table 4.1 Life expectancy by socioeconomic group (in years), 1995-2000
Males Females
25 35 45 55 64 25 35 45 55 64
Low education 73.1 73.8 74.5 75.9 78.4 79.5 79.9 80.4 81.4 83.0
Low secondary education 76.0 76.4 77.0 78.1 80.1 82.0 82.3 82.7 83.6 84.9
High secondary education 76.0 76.4 76.9 78.0 80.0 82.1 82.3 82.7 83.6 84.9
High education 78.0 78.2 78.6 79.4 81.2 82.1 82.3 82.7 83.5 84.8
Note: own calculations based on Deboosere and Gadeyne (2002) and Van Herten et al. (2002).
In the baseline calculation we keep the mortality rates constant. Table 4.1 displays for each
socioeconomic group and for different ages the life expectancy. The difference in life expectancy
between low and high educated males and females is 4.9 and 2.6 years, respectively. Given
gender the most pronounced difference in life expectancy is between persons with low education
and persons with higher educational levels. There is little difference between the life expectancy
of males with low secondary and high secondary education. For females we observe equal life
expectancies for the three highest levels of education.
22Labour participation
Statistics Netherlands provides labour force participation rates per level of education for groups
of age cohorts. Table 4.2 displays these participation rates for the year 2005. From this table we
notice three facts that are relevant for the size of the redistributional effects. First, the labour
force participation of females is signiﬁcantly lower than that of males, in particular for
participants with low and low secondary levels of education. Second, for each gender labour
force participation positively depends on the level of education. Third, there is a remarkable
drop in labour force participation for ages between 55 and 64.
Table 4.2 Labour force participation by socioeconomic group (in % of the cohort size), 2005a
Males Females
L LS HS H L LS HS H
Age 25-34 65.0 84.5 87.2 90.8 27.6 53.3 73.4 87.6
Age 35-44 65.8 84.2 88.7 92.7 32.8 52.6 67.2 80.8
Age 45-54 64.8 82.9 86.2 90.9 32.5 49.7 65.8 77.3
Age 55-64 37.9 50.5 51.5 60.5 14.3 18.4 32.0 47.8
a The participation rates are deﬁned as the active working force in percentage of the total population.
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)
Income proﬁles
As far as we know there are no income proﬁles available by gender and level of education. We
might assume however that both the level of starting income and career proﬁle positively depend
on the level of education. The left panel of table 4.3 presents the income proﬁle imposed for
male workers.
Table 4.3 Incidental wage increase (% per year) and income (in e 2006) at age 25 by socioeconomic group
Males Females
L LS HS H L LS HS H
Incidental wage increase at:
Age 26-34 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.8
Age 35-44 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 0.2 0.7 1.2 1.7
Age 45-54 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.1 0.6 1.1 1.1
Age 55-64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Income at age 25 18,000 22,000 25,000 28,000 17,292 21,135 24,017 26,899
Figure 4.2 displays the gross full-time income of a female as a percentage of the corresponding
income of a male. This ratio is decreasing in age. By lack of data we impose that the relative
income differential of ﬁgure 4.2 holds for each level of education. Combining the information
from the left panel of table 4.3 and ﬁgure 4.2 we are able to calculate educational-speciﬁc
23starting incomes and career steps of females. These ﬁgures are displayed in the right panel of
table 4.3.
Figure 4.2 Female income as a percentage of male income by age, 2004
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4.2 Results
We decompose the uniform contribution rate into a saving share and transfer share. The transfer
share, in turn, is subdivided in an intergenerational transfer, a cross-gender transfer and an
intereducational transfer. In our static baseline scenario the redistributional effects (in percentage
of the uniform contribution rate) are constant over time. Recall that a positive transfer represents
a payment, a negative transfer implies a subsidy.
For each socioeconomic group, the saving share is by far the most important component of
the uniform contribution rate (see ﬁgure 4.3). Nevertheless, the relative size of the transfer- and
saving share differs across groups. The saving share is higher for females than for males and it
increases in the level of education, ranging from 72% for a male participant with low education
to 115% for a female worker with high education. Observe that for female (male) participants
the saving part is higher (lower) than the uniform contribution paid, implying that they receive
(pay) a transfer.
The decomposition of the transfer share is shown in ﬁgure 4.4. Since the real market interest
rate (3%) is higher than the real productivity growth rate (1.7%) plus the population growth
(0%), the implicit return of a pension scheme with uniform pricing is lower than the explicit
return of a pure funded scheme. Therefore, the contribution rate is higher than the generational
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uniform contribution rate. This difference, deﬁned as the intergenerational transfer, is 2% of the
uniform contribution rate.
The cross-gender transfer equals 8.9% for males and −16.3% for females. That means that
for each euro a male worker contributes to the fund, nine cents is transferred to female workers.
Analogously, for each euro a female contributes, she gets a subsidy from the male participants of
around sixteen cents. The reason for the large difference between the payment and subsidy stems
from the fact that there are relatively more male workers in the pension fund population.
Irrespective of gender, uniform pricing entails a large redistribution from low educated
workers to higher educated workers. The high burden imposed on low educated workers can be
explained by two factors. First, the life expectancy of low educated workers is relatively low so
that the actuarial value of their pension rights is relatively low. Second, low educated persons
only constitute about 9% of the working population. Consequently, the intereducational transfer
is imposed on a relatively small group of workers.
Net Beneﬁt and implicit return
Figure 4.5 shows the net beneﬁt (in percentage of lifetime income) of participating in a pension
scheme with uniform pricing from the age of 25. Remember from equation (3.9) that the net
beneﬁt is deﬁned as the difference between the present discounted value of beneﬁts and
contributions. Also in terms of the net beneﬁt we observe a large redistribution from males to
females. The net beneﬁt of male workers is negative, while that of female workers is positive.
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Intereducational redistribution leads to large differences in the net beneﬁt as well. Surprisingly, a
male worker with low secondary education has a higher net beneﬁt (−2.1%) than a worker with
high secondary education (−2.3%). The reason for this is that the former has a slightly higher
life expectancy than the latter (see table 4.1). For a female worker with low education, whose net
beneﬁt is (close to) zero, uniform pricing turns out to be more or less actuarially fair.
The net beneﬁt calculations take the discount rate as given. Alternatively, we can solve for
the implicit rate of return under the assumption that the net beneﬁt equals zero. Differences in
the implicit rates of return within a generation can then be interpreted as intragenerational
redistribution. Figure 4.5 also presents the implicit rates of return for each socioeconomic group.
The implicit return of a low educated male (1.9%) is only slightly higher than the real
productivity growth (1.7%). For a low educated female the implicit return is close to the market
interest rate (3%) which conﬁrms the insight already obtained that uniform pricing for this
person is close to actuarial fairness. For secondary levels of education, the return of males is
roughly 0.5%-points lower than the market interest rate, while the return of females exceeds this
rate by about 0.4%-points. Roughly speaking, for given levels of education the implicit rate of
return of males is 1%-point lower than that of females.
Incomplete career
So far, we assumed that a worker participates over their whole career (i.e. from age 25 until age
64) in the pension scheme. In practice, though, not each individual will work for forty years
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continuously. Figure 4.6 shows the net beneﬁt of an individual, where the numbers on the
horizontal axis indicate the age at which this individual enters the pension scheme. For each
socioeconomic group we observe that the net beneﬁt ﬁrst increases if participation is postponed
and then gradually declines. This reﬂects the fact that the uniform contribution rate is higher
(lower) than the actuarially fair contribution rate at lower (higher) ages. The size and shape of
the net beneﬁt proﬁles strongly depend on gender and level of education though. Compared to a
pension contract with an actuarially fair contribution rate, in which there is no redistribution at
all, participation in a pension contract with uniform pricing is beneﬁcial if the net beneﬁt is equal
to or larger than zero. For females the net beneﬁt is positive, irrespective of the age they enter
and their level of education. Male workers mostly face negative net beneﬁts. For a male with low
education participation is only beneﬁcial at the age of 58 beyond. For males with low secondary,
high secondary and high education this age is, respectively, 47, 48 and 35.
The entrance age at which the net beneﬁt is maximal also differs between socioeconomic
groups. For a female worker with low education the entrance age with maximal net beneﬁt is 43.
For female workers with a higher level of education this age is much lower, namely 34. The
differences with male workers are large. A high educated male should enter the pension scheme
at age 50 to obtain maximal beneﬁt from participation. If he has a secondary level of education,
this age increases to 55 and in case he is low educated, he should wait until the age of 61.
To get some feeling about the redistributional effects in absolute terms, table 4.4 shows the
net beneﬁts in real euros for different spells of participation. These ﬁgures are based on the
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labour force participation rates and wage levels as displayed in tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
In absolute terms uniform pricing is really disadvantageous for a male with high secondary
education. The excess contribution that this person pays roughly amounts to e 18,800 if he
participates from age 25 until age 64 and to about e 17,500 if he chooses to opt out at age 44.
For a high educated female instead, uniform pricing is very proﬁtable. The total transfer she
receives is about e 19,300 if she works forty years continuously and e 18,100 if she enters later
on at age 45. We know that for young workers the uniform contribution rate is in general higher
than the actuarially fair contribution rate. For old workers the opposite holds. From table 4.4 we
observe, however, that for male workers with low or secondary education the uniform
contribution rate also exceeds their actuarially contributions in the second half of the career. For
female workers with secondary or high education, in turn, uniform pricing is also proﬁtable in
the ﬁrst half of the career.
Table 4.4 Net beneﬁt (in e 2006)
Males Females
L LS HS H L LS HS H
Participation age:
25-64 − 12,208 − 13,261 − 18,764 − 8,953 204 5,236 11,371 19,314
25-44 − 9,318 − 12,711 − 17,533 − 15,689 − 861 391 781 1,185
45-64 − 2,890 − 550 − 1,232 6,736 1,065 4,845 10,590 18,129
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
To investigate the sensitivity of the results with respect to the assumptions underlying the
baseline scenario, we consider four alternative calculations. In the ﬁrst one we increase real
productivity growth by 0.5%-points to 2.2%. In the second alternative calculation we increase
the real market rate of return from 3% to 4%. In the third and fourth calculations we take an
28alternative view with respect to the gender- and educational-speciﬁc income proﬁles and labour
force participation rates.
Table 4.5 Sensitivity analysis: effects of alternative assumptions relative to baseline resultsa
g= 2.2% r = 4% Equalization of:
Wages Participation
% of the uniform contribution rate
Males, low education
Saving share 0.6 − 2.2 0.4 − 1.2
Intereducational transfer 0.0 − 0.2 − 2.3 − 0.9
Cross-gender transfer 0.7 − 1.3 1.9 2.0
Intergenerational transfer − 1.2 3.8 0.0 0.1
Males, high education
Saving share 0.5 − 2.5 − 1.1 − 2.1
Intereducational transfer 0.0 0.0 − 0.8 0.1
Cross-gender transfer 0.7 − 1.3 1.9 2.0
Intergenerational transfer − 1.2 3.8 0.0 0.1
Females, low education
Saving share 2.2 − 5.6 1.9 − 1.5
Intereducational transfer 0.3 − 0.8 − 2.1 0.2
Cross-gender transfer − 1.3 2.6 0.2 1.2
Intergenerational transfer − 1.2 3.8 0.0 0.1
Females, high education
Saving share 2.2 − 5.9 − 0.2 − 1.5
Intereducational transfer 0.3 − 0.5 0.0 0.2
Cross-gender transfer − 1.3 2.6 0.2 1.2
Intergenerational transfer − 1.2 3.8 0.0 0.1
a Figures are in absolute difference from the baseline.
First consider the impact of a higher productivity growth (ﬁrst column of table 4.5). This
increases the real value of wage-indexed pension rights, and consequently, the uniform
contribution rate also increases from 24.5% to 28.1%. The positive shock in productivity growth
has almost no effect on intereducational redistribution, while the transfer from males to females
slightly increases. Since females generally live longer than males, the value of their pension
rights will relatively increase more. The cross-gender redistribution therefore rises from 8.9% to
9.6% for males and decreases from −16.3% to −17.6% for females.
Higher productivity growth has relatively most effect on the intergenerational payment,
which declines from 2% to 0.8%. With higher productivity growth the implicit rate of return of a
pure PAYG scheme increases and, consequently, the rate of return of a pension scheme with
uniform pricing increases as well. The decline of the intergenerational transfer leads to an
increase of the saving share for each socioeconomic group. This increase is higher for females
than for males because the cross-gender transfer has also changed in favour of the female worker.
29An increase of the market interest rate to 4% has effects opposite to a change in productivity
growth (second column of table 4.5). The interest rate increase leads to a drop of the uniform
contribution rate to 18.8%. Again, the intereducational redistribution is almost unaffected. The
interest rate decline has a relatively large effect on the pension rights of females. The
cross-gender redistribution therefore declines to 7.6% for males and increases to -13.6% for
females. There is also a substantial increase in the intergenerational transfer (from 2% to almost
6%) since the implicit rate of return of the pension scheme has been declined.
The third column presents the redistributional effects if we assume complete wage
equalization. In this scenario all workers, irrespective of gender and level of education, face the
wage proﬁle of a low secondary male (see the third column of table 4.3). The fourth column
does the same for labour force participation. We observe that in our average-wage scheme both
wage equalization and labour force participation equalization have very small effects on
redistribution. Recall that from a theoretical point of view uniform pricing redistributes from
persons with a short life expectancy to persons with a long life expectancy and from persons
with a ﬂat income or participation proﬁle to persons with a steep one. However, the results from
table 4.5 indicate that, from an empirical point of view, redistribution from persons with short
life expectancies to persons with long life expectancies is much more important than the other
two factors of intragenerational redistribution.
305 Two alternative scenarios
The population forecast of Statistics Netherlands suggests a further increase and convergence in
life expectancies of males and females in the coming decades. In addition, it is reasonable to
assume that labour force participation of especially females will increase in the Netherlands
(Euwals and Van Vuuren (2005)). In this section we will investigate how the redistributional
effects of the baseline calculation change if we allow for these two future developments.
5.1 Increasing life expectancy
The population forecasts of Statistics Netherlands contains age-speciﬁc survival probabilities per
gender. We have used these forecasts to calculate the future development of the mortality rates
per socioeconomic group.8 There is international evidence that the relative differences in
mortality rates between socioeconomic groups has not declined in the last decades (see, e.g.,
Mackenbach et al. (2003) and Pappas et al. (1993). Following Hári et al. (2006) we have
therefore imposed that the relative differences between the educational-speciﬁc survival
probabilities will not change in the future. In appendix B we explain in detail how the survival
probabilities have been computed.
Table 5.1 Life expectancy for a 25-old individual, 1995/2005, 2025 and 2050
Males Females
95/05 2025 2050 95/05 2025 2050
Low education 73.1 74.6 75.3 79.5 80.5 80.7
Low secondary education 76.0 77.4 78.1 82.0 82.9 83.1
High secondary education 76.0 77.4 78.1 82.1 83.0 83.2
High education 78.0 79.3 80.0 82.1 83.0 83.1
Note: based on population forecast of Statistics Netherlands (2006-2050). See appendix B for more details.
Table 5.1 shows the life expectancies for three years, the base period (1995/2005), 2025 and
2050. After 2050 the survival probabilities are held constant and hence, life expectancy will not
further improve thereafter. The ﬁgures reveal a convergence in life expectancy of males and
females in the coming decades. Between 2005 and 2050 the life expectancy of males is expected
to increase with 2.2 years, which is twice as much as the increase of 1.1 years of females. By
assumption, the absolute increase of life expectancy over time is similar for the different
socioeconomic groups.
Apart from the survival probabilities, we change two other assumptions of the baseline
8 See the Statline database of Statistics Netherlands (at http://www.cbs.nl) for the most recent population forecast
(2006-2050).
31calculation as well in order to make the demographic environment more realistic. First, we set
the population in the base year equal to the actual Dutch population in 2005. Second, the growth
rate of the cohort size at birth (n) is no longer set at zero. Instead, the growth rate is calibrated
using the population forecasts of Statistics Netherlands. This growth is very low and sometimes
even negative, reﬂecting the fact that fertility rates are low in the Netherlands. After 2050 the
growth rate is set at zero again.
Results
The new demographic assumptions imply that the redistributional effects are not constant
anymore. They will gradually change over time until the population structure becomes stable
again. We restrict the analysis to the average redistributional effects over the period 2007-2012
for a worker of age 25.
The uniform contribution rate increases by 1.7%-points. This is primarily due to higher
survival probabilities, which entail a longer retirement period relative to the working period.
Since we have assumed that the relative discrepancies in survival rates between different
socioeconomic groups do not change in the future, the intereducational redistributional effects
are similar to those in the baseline calculation (see table 5.2).
Table 5.2 Redistribution effects with increasing life expectancy, 2007-2012
25-old male 25-old female
L LS HS H L LS HS H
% of the uniform contribution rate
Saving share 77.3 89.6 89.5 98.2 99.3 109.3 111.2 112.1
Intereducational transfer 15.7 3.4 3.5 − 5.2 12.1 2.1 0.3 − 0.7
Cross-gender transfer 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 − 11.1 − 11.1 − 11.1 − 11.1
Intergenerational transfer − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3
Note: positive ﬁgures represent pension contributions paid, negative ﬁgures are pension contributions received.
The convergence in life expectancies between males and females reduces the amount of
cross-gender redistribution. We observe that, relative to the baseline calculation, the subsidy
male workers provide to their female colleagues reduces by 1.6%-points to 7.3% of the uniform
contribution rate. Female workers are confronted with a decline in the subsidy they receive from
male workers equal to 5.2%-points. As a consequence, the saving part of the contribution rate
increases for males and decreases for females.
Interestingly, the intergenerational redistribution is negative (−0.3%) for a 25-old worker.
Recall that this transfer is deﬁned as the difference between the uniform contribution rate and the
generational uniform contribution rate. The generational uniform contribution rate is forward
32looking and takes the increased life expectancy of this 25-old worker fully into account.9 The
uniform contribution rate, instead, reﬂects the pension accrual of all currently working
participants and will gradually adjust when old workers with relatively low life expectancy are
replaced by younger generations of workers. This implies that a generation temporarily receives
a higher return than could be earned at the capital market. To understand this, note that
increasing life expectancy necessarily leads to population growth. Similar to a PAYG system,
population growth increases the implicit return of a pension scheme with uniform pricing
because the transfers to old workers can be borne by more young workers. In the long run, if life
expectancies have converged, the intergenerational transfer will be positive.
5.2 Increasing labour force participation females
In the baseline calculation we assumed constant female labour force participation rates.
However, due to sociological and cultural considerations, it is reasonable to expect that these
participation rates will increase the coming decades (Euwals and Van Vuuren (2005)).
Obviously, an increase of labour force participation of females affects the size of the
intragenerational redistribution, because it changes the composition of the pension fund
population. We therefore extend the previous scenario with increasing female participation rates.
Euwals and Van Vuuren (2005) expect that the labour force participation of males will not
change very much in the future. We therefore keep the labour force participation rates of males
constant, as before.
Table 5.3 Labour force participation of females (in % of the cohort size), 2005, 2008 and 2012a
L LS HS H
2005 2008 2012 2005 2008 2012 2005 2008 2012 2005 2008 2012
Age 25-35 27.6 31.7 33.2 53.3 56.6 58.1 73.4 75.4 76.7 87.6 88.9 89.8
Age 35-44 32.8 36.4 36.6 52.6 56.3 56.5 67.2 70.0 70.1 80.8 82.6 82.6
Age 45-54 32.5 35.4 36.8 49.7 52.6 54.0 65.8 68.6 69.8 77.3 79.3 80.1
Age 55-64 14.3 16.5 19.2 18.4 21.2 25.0 32.0 35.3 39.6 47.8 51.1 55.7
a The participation rates are deﬁned as the active working force in percentage of the total population.
Note: based on Knoef (2006). See appendix B for more details.
Knoef (2006) decomposes the development of Dutch female labour force participation during
the last decade into age, period and cohort effects. The estimated age, period and cohort effects
provide a tool to predict future participation rates for different socioeconomic groups. The
forecasts of Knoef (2006) are based on the assumption that the relative differences between
socioeconomic groups will not change in the future. The forecasts are deﬁned in gross terms
9 See equation (A.6) in appendix A.
33(labour force divided by total population) and for each age cohort. We follow the convention
used by Statistics Netherlands to deﬁne the participation rates for groups of ten age cohorts. In
addition, participation rates are deﬁned in net terms (active labour force divided by total
population) because only people who are actually working build up occupational pension.
Appendix B explains how we have transformed the gross participation rates into net rates.
Table 5.3 shows the predicted labour force participation rates for two years, 2008 and 2012.
The 2005 ﬁgures repeat the participation rates of the baseline scenario. After 2012 we keep the
labour force participation constant. The coming years female labour force participation is
expected to increase for each cohort group. In particular, the participation rates of female
workers of age 55 and older will increase substantially. The same holds for the youngest
category female worker with a low level of education.
Table 5.4 Redistribution effects with increasing female labour force participation, 2007-2012
25-old male 25-old female
L LS HS H L LS HS H
% of the uniform contribution rate
Saving share 77.0 89.3 89.2 97.8 99.3 109.7 111.5 112.3
Intereducational transfer 15.6 3.4 3.5 − 5.1 12.4 2.0 0.2 − 0.6
Cross-gender transfer 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 − 11.2 − 11.2 − 11.2 − 11.2
Intergenerational transfer − 0.4 − 0.4 − 0.4 − 0.4 − 0.4 − 0.4 − 0.4 − 0.4
Note: positive ﬁgures represent pension contributions paid, negative ﬁgures are pension contributions received.
Results
Table 5.4 presents the redistributional effects over the period 2007-2012, again for a 25-year-old
worker. The increasing labour force participation of females slightly rises the uniform
contribution rate by 0.1%-points. Obviously, the increase in female labour force participation
does not affect the intereducational redistributional effects of male workers.
The effects on cross-gender redistribution are quite modest. Compared to the previous
variant, the transfer that a male worker pays to females rises with 0.5%-point to 7.8% and the
transfer that a female worker receives, decreases with only 0.1%-point to −11.2%.
Consequently, the insurance part of the uniform contribution rate slightly decreases for males
and increases for females.
In the sensitivity analysis of subsection 4.3 we concluded that the impact of labour force
participation proﬁles on the redistributional effects is much lower than that of different life
expectancies. In this section we observe the same picture. The converging life expectancies of
males and females reduces the cross-gender transfers, but the increase of female labour force
participation only slightly affects these transfers.
346 Concluding remarks
In this study we analysed the size of the saving- and transfer component in Dutch occupational
pensions for different socioeconomic groups. We focused solely on the (ex ante) redistributional
effects associated with uniform pricing. In reality of course, there are more forms of
redistribution on which we did not pay attention, like redistributional effects caused by risk
solidarity or by the tax regime. Especially the ﬁrst one, risk solidarity, may lead to large
intergenerational transfers (see, for example, Hoevenaars and Ponds (2006)). However, contrary
to redistribution related to uniform pricing, these redistributional effects are not structural in the
sense that they depend on the ﬁnancial position of the pension fund.
The main ﬁndings of the study are as follows. First of all, at the individual level a pension
scheme with uniform pricing is not a fair insurance over the entire career. As long as the growth
rate of the population plus that of aggregate income is less than the market interest rate, each
participant pays an implicit tax which is necessary to service the introductory gain given away to
the ﬁrst generations. This intergenerational transfer is rather small (2%), although its size is very
sensitive to the market interest rate. In addition, since participants of a pension fund differ ex
ante in terms of life expectancy, income perspectives and labour force participation proﬁle,
uniform pricing also redistributes between individuals of the same generation. Our analysis
reveals that differences in life expectancy are far more important for intragenerational
redistribution than differences in income proﬁle or the development of labour force participation.
Second, the saving- and transfer share of the uniform contribution rate signiﬁcantly differ
across socioeconomic groups. We ﬁnd that 9% of the contribution of males is transferred to
females. On the other hand, females receive a transfer of 16%. In addition, uniform pricing leads
to a substantial redistribution from low educated people to higher educated people. Not only is
the life expectancy of low educated people signiﬁcantly lower than that of higher educated
people, also their share in the pension fund population is relatively small which further increases
the burden imposed on an individual of this group.
Third, a pension scheme with uniform pricing is disadvantageous for low and middle
educated males and beneﬁcial for middle and high educated females. The net beneﬁt of male
workers is negative, varying from −3.3% of lifetime income for a low educated male to −0.9%
for a high educated male. For female workers, in turn, net beneﬁt is positive, ranging from about
0.1% for a low educated female to 2.4% for a high educated female. The same picture emerges
from socioeconomic differences in implicit rates of return.
Finally, in the near future the population forecasts reveal a convergence in life expectancies
of males relative to females. In addition, it might be reasonable to assume that labour force
participation rates of females will increase in the coming decades. Both developments affect the
amount of cross-gender redistribution. The ﬁrst one will actually reduce cross-gender
redistribution, the second one will increase it. We conclude that the effect of converging life
35expectancies dominates which implies that the transfers from males to females are likely to
decline in the future.
In the paper we have made some simplifying assumptions. First, the Dutch occupational
pension system, which consists of a large amount of industrial pension funds and company
pension funds, has been captured in a single representative fund. It is likely that the
heterogeneity of the participants in actual ﬁrm- or industry-speciﬁc pension funds could be
somewhat less pronounced than that in our representative fund. Second, we have only focused
on old-age pensions while most of the pension arrangements also include a uniform surcharge to
ﬁnance surviving dependants’ pensions. Since in general the chance that the wife survives her
husband is higher rather than the other way around, uniform pricing of surviving dependants’
pensions can (partly) mitigate the cross-gender redistribution. On the other hand, in the
Netherlands at least, participants can convert the accrued surviving dependants’ pension rights
into a more generous old-age pension. Further analysis is required to investigate to what extent
these simplifying assumptions are decisive for the main conclusions.
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38Appendix A Technical details
In this appendix we provide formal deﬁnitions of the individual, generational and gender-speciﬁc
uniform contribution rates used to identify the intergenerational, cross-gender and
intereducational transfers. First we deﬁne the unit cost price of a wage-indexed pension beneﬁt.
Unit cost price
In the main text we used the letter j as age indicator and the letter t as time indicator. Here we
introduce two additional symbols to indicate gender and level of education of an individual. Let
h be the gender indicator to distinguish males (m) from females (f), that is h = m, f, and let i
denote the educational level, where i = L,LS,HS,H. Then the cost price of a wage-indexed
pension beneﬁt of one euro for an individual of gender h, with level of education i, of age j and
at the end of time t is given by:
δ(h,i, j,t) =
jr−j−2
Õ
l=0
ε(h,i, j+l,t +l)(1+g(t +l +1))(1+φ(t +l +1))
1+r(t +l +1)
×Z(h,i, jr −1,t + jr − j−1) (A.1)
for jw ≤ j < jr −1 and with:
Z(h,i, jr −1,t) =
je−jr+1
å
n=1
n
Õ
m=1
ε(h,i, jr +m−2,t +m−1)(1+g(t +m))(1+φ(t +m))
1+r(t +m)
(A.2)
Note that δ(h,i, jr −1,t) = Z(h,i, jr −1,t). Equation (A.2) represents the value of a
wage-indexed pension beneﬁt of one euro measured at the age just before retiring (i.e. jr −1).
Equation (A.1) is the discounted value of this annuity at age j, which is jr − j periods from
retiring.
Individual uniform contribution rate
We deﬁne the following two variables for j = jw,..., jr −1:
PVA(h,i, j,t) ≡ A(h,i, j,t)δ(h,i, j,t) (A.3)
ˆ G(h,i, j,t) ≡ G(h,i, j,t)p(h,i, j,t) (A.4)
Then the individual uniform contribution rate (πIU) is deﬁned as:
πIU(h,i,t) =



å
jr−jw−1
k=0 PVA(h,i,jw+k,t+k)R(h,i,k)
å
jr−jw−1
k=0 ˜ G(h,i,jw+k,t+k)R(h,i,k) if j = jw
πIU(h,i,t −1) if jw < j < jr
(A.5)
with discount factor R already deﬁned in equation (3.9).
39Generational uniform contribution rate
The generational uniform contribution rate (πGU) is given by:
πGU(t) =



åhåiB(h,i,jw,t)å
jr−jw−1
k=0 PVA(h,i,jw+k,t+k)R(h,i,k)
åhåiB(h,i,jw,t)å
jr−jw−1
k=0 ˜ G(h,i,jw+k,t+k)R(h,i,k) if j = jw
πGU(t −1) if jw < j < jr
(A.6)
Now we can stress the relation between the generational uniform contribution rate (πGU) and the
uniform contribution rate (πU). For simpliﬁcation, assume that productivity growth (g), the
nominal interest rate (r), survival probabilities (ε) and labour force participation rates (p) are
constant. Also, let the growth rate of the cohort at birth be zero (n = 0). Then, using
equation (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4), we can rewrite the ﬁrst branch of equation (A.6) in a similar
fashion as equation (3.6). This gives,
πGU(t) =
åhåiå
jr−jw−1
k=0 B(h,i, jw +k,t)PVA(h,i, jw +k,t)S(k)
åhåiå
jr−jw−1
k=0 B(h,i, jw +k,t) ˜ G(h,i, jw +k,t)S(k)
(A.7)
with,
S(k) =

1+g
1+r
k
(A.8)
Note that, besides the factor S, equation (A.6) is identical to equation (3.6). Since there is no
population growth, the implicit return of a PAYG scheme is 1+g. Remember that the rate of
return of a pension scheme with uniform pricing is a weighted average of the implicit return of a
PAYG scheme and the market interest rate. Hence, if the return of a PAYG scheme equals the
market interest rate, a pension scheme with uniform pricing offers exactly the same return as the
capital market. In this case S(k) = 1 for each k, and the generational uniform contribution rate is
equal to the uniform contribution rate. However, if r > g, as we have imposed in the baseline
calculation, the uniform contribution rate exceeds the generational uniform rate and the
difference entails intergenerational redistribution.
Gender-speciﬁc uniform contribution rate
The gender-speciﬁc uniform contribution rate has exactly the same form as equation (A.6),
instead that we know have to aggregate over males and females separately. Denoting this
contribution rate by πSU we thus have,
πSU(h,t) =



åiB(h,i,jw,t)å
jr−jw−1
k=0 PVA(h,i,jw+k,t+k)R(h,i,k)
åiB(h,i,jw,t)å
jr−jw−1
k=0 ˜ G(h,i,jw+k,t+k)R(h,i,k) if j = jw
πSU(h,t −1) if jw < j < jr
(A.9)
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Computation of the future mortality rates
Since forecasts of the educational-speciﬁc mortality rates are not publicly available for the
Netherlands, we have to compute these ﬁgures ourselves. Starting points are the gender-speciﬁc
mortality rates of the most recent population forecast of Statistics Netherlands, denoted
ˆ σ(h, j,t). The forecast horizon of these estimates ranges from 2006 to 2050. The computation of
the educational-speciﬁc mortality rates involves the following two steps:
1. Weighting. The educational-speciﬁc mortality rates are generated by the following formula:
ˆ σ(h,i, j,t) = ω(h,i, j)ˆ σ(h, j,t) (B.1)
in which the adjustment factors ω(h,i, j) are time-invariant and computed using a procedure
described in Hári et al. (2006). In fact, ω(h,i, j) measures the discrepancy of the mortality rate
of an individual of gender h, educational level i and age j relative to the average rate.
2. Scaling. We have not used the levels ˆ σ(h,i, j,t) in our calculations directly. Instead, we have
applied the following scaling to get rid of the discrepancy between the population forecast,
ˆ σ(h, j,t), and the mortality rates we use in our baseline calculation (see table 4.1).:
σ(h,i, j,t) =



σ(h,i, j,base year) if t = base year
σ(h,i, j,t −1)+Dˆ σ(h,i, j,t) if t > base year
(B.2)
where 2005 is our base year. Obviously, the survival rates ε(h,i, j,t) used in the formulas in the
text are equal to 1−σ(h,i, j,t).
Computation of the female labour force participation rates
Knoef (2006) predicts female labour force participation rates for each age cohort (see ﬁgure B.1).
These rates are in gross terms, i.e., they are deﬁned as the total labour force (employed and
unemployed people) divided by the total population. In this study, labour force participation
rates are deﬁned in net terms, i.e. as the active working force divided by the total population. In
addition, Statistics Netherlands reports educational-speciﬁc participation rates for groups of age
cohorts only. The transformation from gross participation rates, deﬁned for each age cohort, to
net participation rates, deﬁned for groups of age cohorts, involves the following three steps:
1. Grouping. Let z denote the group indicator, i.e. z = 1,2,3,4, and lz and uz the lower- and
upper-bound of z, expressed in age. The lower-bounds are l1 = 25,l2 = 35,l3 = 45,l4 = 55 and
for the upper-bounds we have u1 = 34,u2 = 44,u3 = 54,u4 = 64. Denoting the predicted gross
participation by ˆ pB, the grouped participation rates are deﬁned as:
ˆ pB(f,i,z,t) =
å
uz
j=lz ˆ pB(f,i, j,t) ˆ B(f, j,t)
å
uz
j=lz
ˆ B(f, j,t)
(B.3)
where the age-dependent participation rates are weighted with the corresponding female
population obtained from the population forecasts of Statistics Netherlands.
41Figure B.1 Predicted gross labour force participation rates of females
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2. Deﬂating. The predicted net participation rates ˆ p are derived from the formula:
ˆ p(f,i,z,t) = ˆ pB(f,i,z,t)(1− ˆ u(f,i,z,t)) (B.4)
with ˆ u the predicted unemployment rate (i.e. the total number of unemployed as percentage of
the labour force). Predictions of educational-speciﬁc unemployment rates are not available.
Hence we have to rely on some approximation rule. The CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis publishes projections of the macro unemployment rate. We use the following
approximation rule:
ˆ u(f,i,z,t) = u(f,i,z,2005)
ˆ u(t)
ˆ u(t −1)
(B.5)
3. Scaling. Confronting the predicted values ˆ p with the realised values p for the year 2005 reveal
some small differences. Therefore, we will not use these predicted participation rates directly.
Instead, we take ﬁrst differences and relate these differences with the realisations in the base
year (2005).
p(f,i,z,t) =



p(f,i,z,base year) if t = base year
p(f,i,z,t −1)+D ˆ p(f,i,z,t) if t > base year
(B.6)
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